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A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON TRADE
INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS
Terry Collins-Williams*
INTRODUCTION
HANK you, Professor Norris Pettis for the introduction. I also
want to thank Professor James Hollifield and Kathleen Cooper for
inviting me to participate in this conference. As well, I bring you
greetings from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade in Ottawa, Canada, a supporter of this conference, and my former
employer, who saw fit to recommend that I participate in this event. I
must emphasize that I am speaking today in my own capacity.
I am grateful for this opportunity to participate in your discussion. I
am heartened by the interest in and commitment expressed here to trade
expansion across the Americas.
In my remarks, I will try to give you an impression of Canada's ap-
proach to trade policy and negotiations, particularly in the context of our
trade with the Americas. I will explore some of the challenges relating to
regional trade integration in an era of globalization. From my perspec-
tive as a former trade agreements negotiator, I will examine options
available to pursue integration and trade liberalization, including multi-
lateral and regional, or other preferential approaches. Finally, I will com-
ment on some of the specific initiatives Canada has embarked on to
deepen trade ties with our neighbors in the Americas.
For Canada, trade is a vital component of our economy. According to
the World Trade Organization's Trade Profiles, Canada's trade to GDP
ratio for the years 2004 - 2006 is 72.3, making us one of the most trade
dependent nations in the developed world. Significantly, 82 percent of
our exports are destined to the United States market, meaning that bilat-
eral trade with the USA dominates our global and hemispheric trade re-
lationships. In turn, 55 percent of our imports come from the United
States. By comparison, only 1 percent of our exports and 4 percent of our
imports are accounted for by our next largest American trading partner,
Mexico.
Canada's trade dependency, though high among developed countries,
is not out of line with many of our trading partners in the Americas. For
example, Argentina has a trade to GDP ratio of 64, Chile of 73, Costa
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Rico of 102, Jamaica of 105 and Mexico of 63. (By comparison, the
United States trade-to-GDP ratio is 26.)
The importance of trade to all of our economies, to a greater or lesser
degree, dictates that we pay close attention to the challenges of global
competitiveness. Over the last three decades, a confluence of factors in-
cluding unprecedented advances in technology, rapidly rising investment
flows, and re-organization of means of production have spawned the phe-
nomenon known as globalization. Goods, services, information, technol-
ogy, and capital can now originate in, and move to or from practically
anywhere in the world.
In this period, trade has expanded at a rapid pace, far in excess of
global production. Trade has been one of the key vehicles in the intensifi-
cation of globalization, which undoubtedly explains why trade and its in-
stitutional representation, the World Trade Organization, have become
prime targets for the critics of globalization. It was not accidental that the
rise of global trade integration coincided with the creation of the WTO.
One of the principal results of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
in 1995 was to transform the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(the GATT), a contractual arrangement governing trade relations among
nation signatories dating back to the post-war Bretton Woods initiatives,
into a full-fledged international organization. The establishment of the
WTO reflected recognition, by the overwhelming majority of countries
involved in the international trading system, that the process of trade lib-
eralization and the emergence of increasing economic interdependence
required an institutional and constitutional base beyond the GATT. In
this way, governments explicitly recognized the gains which accrue from
entering into durable and binding trade commitments and providing a
structured and functionally effective means to harness the value of trade.
However, the trading system, as reflected by the WTO, is facing nu-
merous challenges, and not just the inability to date to bring to closure its
latest set of multilateral trade negotiations. Clearly, the dynamics of
global commercial politics are changing dramatically. No longer is eco-
nomic power concentrated in the hands of a few industrialized countries.
While the share of global trade among the new economic powers of Bra-
zil, Russia, India, and China has doubled in the past ten years, the OECD
Members' share has declined by more than 10 percent. The days are past
when the United States and the European Union can determine the
agenda and outcomes of multilateral trade negotiations between the two
of them. At the same time, public support for trade liberalization is see-
ing marked decline as the perception takes hold that the rise in competi-
tiveness of newly industrialized states, and especially of China, is having
negative consequences for labor and incomes in developed countries and
elsewhere. Yet, the reality is that international trade contributes mas-
sively to economic growth, as witnessed by the extent to which Canada's
economic performance has been fuelled by trade. Moreover, it is well
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understood that successful countries in the global economic race have
consistently practiced trade liberalization.
How has the Latin American and Caribbean region fared in this era of
international trade competition? In the period 1991 to 2000, exports
grew at a rate of over 9 percent annually and from 2004 to 2006, at rates
over 20 percent per year. At the same time, many of these countries have
been at the forefront of trade liberalization. Between the mid-1980s and
1990s, the average external tariff in the region declined from over 40 per-
cent to 11 percent. Nor have Latin American countries shied away from
economic interaction with the Chinese juggernaut. In 2005, Latin
America was the second largest recipient of Chinese direct investment
among regions of the world, trailing only Asia. In 2006, trade between
Latin America and China rose to over seventy billion dollars, a seven-
fold increase from the year 2000.
If we accept that trade liberalization makes a significant contribution to
economic growth, how then is it accomplished and can it be advanced?
The current international trading system was established in the wake of
the disastrous experiences of the 1930s Depression. The world economy
was thrown into chaos by the adoption of "beggar thy neighbor policies"
on the part of the largest traders, closing borders to trade by a combina-
tion of massive tariff hikes and currency devaluations. In the wake of this
disaster, the GATT was set up in the post-war period to provide the foun-
dation for nations to cooperate in international trade, to provide predict-
ability, transparency and stability in trade relations, and to offer a forum
for rule-making and liberalization. Successive rounds of trade negotia-
tions have been conducted under the auspices of the GATT. The first
seven of these, from the late 1940s through the 1970s, mainly addressed
tariffs and other border measures impeding trade. In the 1980s, a more
comprehensive approach was launched at Punta del Este, taking multilat-
eral trade negotiations more deeply into the realm of domestic economic
regulation as it affects trade, culminating in the establishment of the
World Trade Organization and the Uruguay Round Agreements.
More recently, Members of the WTO launched a new round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations in Doha in 2001. This round is named the Doha
Development Agenda in recognition of the aspirations of developing
members to fashion a negotiating agenda which would address their con-
cerns. The Doha Declaration gives prominence to the needs and objec-
tives of the Latin American and Caribbean region by recognizing, inter-
alia, the importance of correcting and preventing restrictions and distor-
tions in world agricultural markets; in reducing or eliminating tariff
peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation, and non-tariff barriers to products of
export interest to developing countries; and in the implementation and
interpretation of the TRIPs Agreement in a manner supportive of public
health. Naturally, agriculture is a high priority for many Latin American
participants given that the region is probably the most efficient agricul-
tural and agro-industrial producer in the world. According to estimates
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by the World Bank, Latin America, and MERCOSUR countries in par-
ticular, would be the largest beneficiaries of meaningful agricultural trade
liberalization. Unfortunately, negotiations to date have not been capable
of producing such a result. That is not to say that Latin American coun-
tries should lose hope or interest in the Doha Round. Indeed, multilat-
eral negotiations offer the only venue where comprehensive liberalization
in the agriculture sector can be achieved, particularly for the issue of sub-
sidy disciplines. As has been demonstrated in the FTAA experience, ma-
jor agricultural trading powers in any one region are not going to agree to
dismantle subsidy programs to their agricultural producers and exporters
thereby leaving the field free to a non-participant outside the region, such
as the European Union, to continue distorting international markets. It is
this agricultural liberalization imperative that makes Brazil, in my opin-
ion, one of the major demanders to complete the Doha Round
negotiations.
Evidently, multilateral negotiations are not the only means by which to
achieve trade liberalization. First, it must be said that as much, if not
more, liberalization has been achieved by unilateral measures, as through
international negotiation. Governments and private sector participants
have often recognized that tariff cuts or deregulation within an economy
can be powerful tools of growth. Even in these instances, however, inter-
national agreements are of use as they can provide the international com-
mitment and sometimes the means of enforceability to bind these
unilateral reform measures against future changes.
Going back to the international dimension, clearly multilateralism is
not, nor should it be, the only approach to liberalization and to the nego-
tiation of trade agreements. Indeed, plurilateral trading arrangements
abound and have been proliferating rapidly in recent years. Of the three
hundred such arrangements notified since the inception of the GATT,
almost two hundred have come into effect since 1995. It has been said
that Mongolia is the only WTO Member which is not a party to some
form of preferential trading arrangement. These plurilaterals can take
many forms - Customs Unions such as MERCOSUR with common ex-
ternal tariffs, bilateral or regional free trade agreements, and less formal
economic cooperation arrangements.
There is quite a debate among trade commentators as to the merits and
demerits of multilateral versus preferential trade arrangements. Two re-
cent high level reports, that of the Sutherland Board on the future of the
WTO and that of the Warwick Commission, entitled the Multilateral
Trade Regime: Which Way Forward, have expressed concern that the
proliferation of plurilateral trade agreements threatens to damage the in-
ternational trade system. They see PTAs undermining the fundamental
principle of non-discrimination on which the WTO is founded, excluding
non-participants from trade benefits and distorting trade flows. They ex-
press concern about the "spaghetti bowl" approach to trade liberalization
in which separate preferential agreements between and among trading
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nations create divergent and complex rules of origin which might impede
investments and production processes for businesses operating across
multiple jurisdictions in our increasingly integrated world economy.
From the other perspective, it is held that plurilateral trade arrange-
ments secure benefits that cannot be realized at the multilateral level,
where the diversity or sheer number of participants may impede progress.
Thus, a free trade agreement may go further and deeper in terms of
policy coverage and commitments than the WTO. In some instances, it
can be seen that a free trade agreement can set the tone for subsequent
progress at the multilateral level. FTAs may also allow participants to
hone in on specific trade issues or irritants between the participants which
may not attract sufficient attention or priority at the multilateral level.
Latin American and Caribbean countries have been very active in ne-
gotiation of plurilateral trade arrangements including four Customs Un-
ions and free trade agreements with partners both within and outside the
region. In 2004, about 62 percent of Latin American and Caribbean ex-
ports were covered by some form of PTA, a tenfold increase from the
situation in 1991.
Let me turn now to Canada's interests and initiatives in the region.
Last July, Canada's Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, stated, "Canada's
New Government has made clear that re-engagement in its hemisphere is
a critical international priority for our country".
Canada is a country of the Americas. This is a fact of geography which
in turn has been reinforced by strong historical, commercial, and personal
linkages. Our political and economic interests in the Americas are real
and significant. For these reasons, in 1989 Canada joined the Organiza-
tion of American States. Canada soon became the second largest con-
tributor to the OAS budget and has hosted meetings of the OAS General
Assembly, the Pan-American Games and the 2001 Quebec Summit which
launched the historic Inter-American Democratic Charter.
Canada's trade and investment ties to the Americas are substantial.
Canadian private sector investments in the Latin American and Carib-
bean region have tripled in the last decade to 107 billion dollars in 2006.
A few concrete examples may help demonstrate the extent and diversity
of Canadian involvement in the area: a Canadian mining company has
invested 2 billion dollars in Columbia; a Canadian firm has a chemical
complex in Chile worth 1.2 billion dollars; one Canadian bank has invest-
ments of over 2.6 billion dollars in five smaller Latin American countries;
a Canadian apparel manufacturer invested over 500 million dollars in
manufacturing operations in two Central American countries.
Canada has pursued an active trade negotiating strategy with the re-
gion. The Free Trade Agreement negotiated with the United States in
the late 1980s was subsequently expanded to Mexico under NAFTA.
This was followed by bilateral trade agreements with Chile and Costa
Rica. From each of these agreements, the return in terms of increased
trade is evident. With Mexico, trade over the past ten years has increased
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about two and a half times, and with Chile almost four times. Our trade
with Costa Rica has more than doubled in the last five years.
Before leaving the subject of our Free Trade Agreement with Chile,
allow me to digress to a trade negotiating subject close to my heart. In
our negotiations with the United States and under NAFTA, Canada held
that trade rules governing the imposition of anti-dumping laws should be
given special consideration. The removal of trade barriers under a free
trade agreement should obviate the conditions in which private firms
could practice price discrimination across the border (the condition which
anti-dumping measures in theory are designed to counteract). Indeed,
under the conditions of an FTA, the continuance of anti-dumping reme-
dies penalizes companies on opposite sides of the border for engaging in
practices that are encouraged by competition policy within their respec-
tive domestic markets. In negotiations with Chile, we encountered an
economically rational trading partner who accepted our argument and
agreed to eliminate the application of anti-dumping law to the trade of
goods of the other party. This surely is an example of a trade negotiating
outcome between two partners which sets a standard for others.
Back to Canada's trade initiatives in the Americas. We have continued
to pursue an active negotiating agenda, first with the Central American
four - El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, which have
been stalled for some time, though I understand our current Trade Minis-
ter is determined to get them back on track. Negotiations with Peru have
been concluded and await ratification, and negotiations are underway
with Columbia, Dominican Republic, and CARICOM. Most recently we
have launched exploratory discussions with Panama.
All of these negotiations might suggest searching for a more efficient
venue to pursue hemispheric trade liberalization, especially when one
considers that most other countries in the region are engaged in similar
exercises with an array of trading partners. As we all know, one does not
need to search far for the alternative in the form of the Free Trade of the
Americas initiative. Unfortunately, that initiative has not proceeded,
foundering on much the same issues which are bedeviling negotiations in
Geneva: agricultural reform; trade rules; plus hesitancy to take on com-
mitments on investment and procurement.
Canada is prepared to negotiate in whatever form will contribute to
trade liberalization and economic growth. I personally do not see there
being a preference between multilateral or plurilateral negotiations. The
two can and should be complementary. In the late 1980s, Canada made a
conscious choice to pursue bilateral negotiations with the United States
in parallel with the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations. In retro-
spect it can be seen that the FTA outcome later expanded to NAFTA,
provided momentum and substantive input to the multilateral negotia-
tions in areas such as services.
And who knows what incentive it may have given the Europeans at the
time to step up to the table in Geneva seeing two of their largest trading
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partners making a bilateral commitment to market opening? More re-
cently Robert Zoelleck, former U.S. Trade Representative, characterized
the United States' willingness to pursue trade negotiations on multiple
fronts as "competitive liberalization." I take Mr. Zoelleck's use of the
word "competitive" in this context to signify competition between and
among nations to promote liberalization, not a race between countries to
get one up over other trading partners.
CONCLUSION
Finally, I want to conclude with a word about the Washington Consen-
sus itself. Without entering into the debate about the merits or demerits
of the Washington Consensus as a model for overall economic policy, I
think it is safe to say that the trade elements of this approach, based on a
commitment to trade liberalization and open markets, have proven suc-
cessful to those Latin American countries which have chosen to follow it.
I will leave the last words to John Williamson, the "godfather" of the
Washington consensus. As Williamson so aptly put it, "I do not detect a
groundswell of support for abandoning export promotion in favor of a
new wave of import substitution."
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Legal and Institutional
Dimensions of Reform

